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Abstract
For enterprise, personal and societal applications, there
is now an increasing demand for automated authentica-
tion of identity from images using computer vision. How-
ever, current authentication technologies are still vulnera-
ble to presentation attacks. We present RoPAD, an end-to-
end deep learning model for presentation attack detection
that employs unsupervised adversarial invariance to ignore
visual distractors in images for increased robustness and
reduced overfitting. Experiments show that the proposed
framework exhibits state-of-the-art performance on presen-
tation attack detection on several benchmark datasets.
1. Introduction
Biometric identity authentication technologies based on
computer vision, such as face and iris recognition, have be-
come ubiquitous in recent times. However, biometric au-
thentication methods are still prone to presentation attacks,
where spoof samples (e.g. printed pictures or videos of a
person) are presented to the biometric sensor, attempting to
gain unauthorized access. Furthermore, other factors, such
as the rising ease of 3D printing technology and capturing
very realistic high-resolution images and videos of people’s
faces due to advancements in camera technologies as well
as generative adversarial networks make creating these pre-
sentation attacks much easier. As illustrated in Figure 1,
which shows samples of genuine faces and presentation at-
tacks, learning subtle feature to differentiate the two is very
challenging even for humans. Therefore, it is crucial to aug-
ment face recognition systems with presentation attack de-
tection (PAD) methods in order to improve the security of
face authentication systems.
Presentation attack detection methods can be broadly
categorized into two classes. The first class of methods de-
pends on augmenting the biometric authentication hardware
with an additional sensor that provides auxiliary data that
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Figure 1: Among all the images, which are genuine images
and which are presentation attacks?1
can be used (with or without the original biometric data)
by a presentation attack detection algorithm. For exam-
ple, light field cameras (LFCs) have been used to capture
multiple depth images of faces, which are then analyzed
through a rule-based scheme for PAD [20]. This class of
methods is limited by large cost and legacy system com-
patibility constraints. The second class of methods directly
uses regular data captured by the authentication system for
presentation attack detection using, for example, signal pro-
cessing and/or machine learning algorithms. These methods
extract features, such as Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [21],
and classify them as bona fide or attack using a downstream
1
(b)and(c)aregenuinefacesforauthentication.
classifier, such as support vector machine, or use a convolu-
tional neural network (CNN) for both learned representation
extraction and classification [13]. The second class of ap-
proaches for PAD are, however, inherently challenging and
have garnered tremendous research interest in recent times.
While the use of deep neural networks (DNNs) in PAD has
led to major boosts in performance [13], their inherent lim-
itations, such as vulnerability to overfitting, need for vast
amounts of training data, etc. prevent DNN-based systems
from reaching their full potential.
One such limitation of DNNs, like most machine learn-
ing models, is that they could learn incorrect associations
between nuisance factors in the raw data and the final pre-
diction target (e.g. pose, gender or skin tone nuisance fac-
tors in face recognition), leading to poor generalization. Ex-
isting DNN-based PAD methods do not address this inher-
ent problem and can, hence, be made more robust by incor-
porating learning techniques that induce robustness through
invariance to nuisance factors.
In this paper, we propose RoPAD, a novel end-to-end
deep neural network model for presentation attack detec-
tion that robustly classifies face images as “live” (i.e. real)
or “spoof” (i.e. fake) by being invariant to visual distractors
inherent in images. The invariance is achieved by adopt-
ing the unsupervised adversarial invariance (UAI) frame-
work [12], which induces implicit feature selection and in-
variance to nuisance factors within neural networks without
requiring nuisance annotations. Most of the visual content
in face images is not relevant for PAD. For example, given a
face image, the identity of the person, variations in the pose
of the face, fine-grained facial attributes, and elements of
the background of the image are irrelevant to PAD. There-
fore, employing UAI as a core component of the proposed
model makes it largely invariant to all such distractors in an
inexpensive yet effective way.
The proposed RoPAD model exhibits state-of-the-art
performance on 3DMAD [7], Idiap Replay-Mobile [6],
Idiap Replay-Attack [4], MSU-MFSD [23] and GCT1, a
new self-collected dataset (described in Section 4.1), which
includes common forms of presentation attacks studied in
recent literature, viz., printed faces-images, video replays
and 3D masks [7, 21]. Ablation study of a base model
(BM), which does not include UAI, shows that UAI pro-
vides a significant boost in performance. This essentially
proves that invariance to visual distractors makes PAD sig-
nificantly more robust and effective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides a brief review of existing face PAD methods. In
Section 3 we discuss a data factorization rationale of PAD
and describe the proposed RoPAD model. Section 4 sum-
marizes the results of our experimental evaluation. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses directions for
future work.
2. Related Work
PAD methods for image-based biometric authentication
have traditionally involved extraction of discriminative fea-
tures, such as specular reflection, blurriness, chromatic mo-
ment, color diversity, etc. and their analysis to distinguish
live (genuine) images from spoof (fake) ones [21, 23]. Pre-
vious works have also incorporated deep learning based la-
tent features computed offline in conjunction with linear
classifiers for PAD as well as learned representations within
a neural network trained end-to-end for the PAD task [17].
Hand-crafted features and statistical machine learning
algorithms have been extensively used in the past for the
detection of print and replay kind of attacks. For example,
texture analysis through extraction of low-level texture fea-
tures has been widely utilized for spoofing detection [15].
Feature descriptors such as Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [9],
Scale-Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) [9] and Speeded
Up Robust Features (SURF) [3] have been popularly em-
ployed to embed faces into low dimension encodings in
prior works [14]. In order to make such feature descrip-
tors more discriminative for PAD, researchers have utilized
different color-spaces such as RGB, HSV and YCbCr [2].
Hand-crafted feature based methods play an important role
in the detection of spoofing given their simplicity and effec-
tiveness in PAD for the domains for which they are specifi-
cally designed. For instance, several texture analysis meth-
ods [18] achieved good performance on the MSU MFSD
dataset.
Deep learning has provided powerful approaches for the
development of effective data-driven models for a plethora
of computer vision tasks. Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) have been employed successfully for PAD re-
cently [16]. Yang et al. [24] were an early adopter of DNNs
for PAD, who achieved significant improvements in detec-
tion performance with simple CNN architectures. More re-
cently, architectures such as 3D-CNN [8], patch-based and
depth-based architectures have been used for PAD [1]. Fur-
thermore, instead of binary supervision, some works uti-
lize spatial and temporal auxiliary information to guide the
training of PAD models [14].
The proposed RoPAD is a DNN-based model for PAD
from raw RGB images that uses a simple CNN architec-
ture coupled with effective unsupervised invariance induc-
tion through UAI for robust PAD without incorporating any
of the aforementioned specialized architecture designs or
training regimens.
3. Robust Presentation Attack Detection
The proposed RoPAD is a DNN model for robust presen-
tation attack detection, which learns to distinguish real face
images from fake ones directly from RGB images in an end-
to-end framework. Robust PAD is achieved by combining
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(a) Base CNN Model of RoPAD
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(b) RoPAD training architecture
Figure 2: (a) Base CNN Model of RoPAD: the base model (BM) is inspired by VGG16 [22], with channel-sizes, activation
shapes, activation functions, and batch-normalization being notable modifications. The model comprises three convolutional
blocks and a prediction block. (b) RoPAD training architecture: the base model is split into encoder (Enc) and predictor
(Pred), and a decoder (Dec) and two disentanglers (D1 and D2) are attached for unsupervised adversarial invariance (UAI).
invariant-representation induction and the DNN’s ability to
learn highly discriminative representations.
3.1. A Data Factorization View of PAD
The face image formation process (S) is a complex in-
teraction of multiple entangled signals. For presentation
attack detection, we are ultimately interested in the gen-
uineness of a presented sample, and therefore the entangled
signals can be split into two main categories — (1) signals
useful for solving the anti-spoofing problem and (2) nui-
sances for the PAD task. Thus, a face image could be ex-
pressed as the result of different factors interacting together
as I .= S(ρ,θ), where ρ represents the nuisances defined as
all the signals presented in the input media that should not
be contributing to the assessment of the genuineness detec-
tion, whereas θ indicates all the signals that are helpful to
solving the PAD task. Most common nuisances for PAD
tasks can be the subjects’s identity, facial attributes, and
elements of the background. Contrastively, signals useful
for PAD include subtle differences of specific patterns, and
characteristic noise affecting non bona fide images. Given
all aforementioned variables, presentation attack detection
can be improved by reverse-engineering the image forma-
tion process θ? = ∇(S(θ,ρ)) to disentangle the important
information from the irrelevant ones.
Specifically, given an image I, a PAD system needs to
analyze θ, without being distracted by other confounding
factors (ρ) present implicitly in the media (e.g. identity,
pose, background, etc.). Note that, at test time, a PAD sys-
tem has only access to I and no access to the individual
variables contributing to S whatsoever.
3.2. Base CNN Model of RoPAD
The core neural network that is responsible for learn-
ing to distinguish between real and fake images is a deep
CNN composed of three convolutional blocks and a final
prediction block interspersed with max-pooling operations.
Each convolutional block contains three convolutional lay-
ers alternating with batch-normalization. The kernel shape
of each of these convolutional layers is (3 × 3), and the
max-pooling is performed over windows of (3 × 3). The
channel size in each block is kept fixed at 256, 128, and 64
in the first, second, and third blocks, respectively. Exponen-
tial Linear Unit (ELU) [5] is used as an activation function
in the convolutional layers of these blocks. The prediction
block contains one convolutional layer with a kernel-shape
of (2 × 2) with the hyperbolic tangent activation, followed
by a reshape operation to produce a 64-dimensional embed-
ding, which is followed by two fully connected layers of
output-sizes 32 and 1 to perform the final binary classifi-
cation task (bona fide versus spoof). Figure 2a illustrates
the complete architecture. The model design is based on
VGG16 [22], with channel-sizes, activation shapes, activa-
tion functions, and batch-normalization being notable mod-
ifications, among others. We empirically found the pro-
posed architecture to perform significantly better than the
standard VGG16.
3.3. Unsupervised Adversarial Invariance
Deep neural networks, like machine learning models in
general, often learn incorrect associations between the pre-
diction target and nuisance factors of data, leading to poor
generalization [12]. Popular approaches to solve this prob-
lem include data augmentation controlled for certain nui-
sance factors or supervised invariance induction to elimi-
nate those factors from the latent representation learned by
those models. In both of those approaches, prior knowl-
edge of nuisance factors is necessary. Additionally, the lat-
ter approach of invariance induction, which performs sig-
nificantly better than the former [12] requires annotations
of nuisance factors to help guide their elimination from the
latent space. This is especially problematic for PAD be-
cause it is a relatively new area of research and suffers from
both the lack of expert knowledge about nuisance factors as
well as nuisance annotations. For example, in the case of
face images for PAD, the identity of the person, their fa-
cial attributes, elements of the background of the image,
etc., can be considered nuisance factors for the PAD task.
While some of these factors can be annotated with large in-
vestments of time and money, others like “elements of the
background” are difficult to quantify concretely.
Jaiswal et al. [12] introduced an unsupervised approach
for learning invariance to all, including potentially un-
known, nuisance factors with respect to a given super-
vised task. Their unsupervised adversarial invariance (UAI)
framework learns a split representation of data into rele-
vant and nuisance factors with respect to the prediction task
without needing annotations for the nuisance factors. The
underlying mechanism of UAI is formulated as a competi-
tion between the prediction and a reconstruction objective
coupled with disentanglement between the two representa-
tions. This forces the prediction model to utilize only those
factors of data that are truly essential for the supervised task
at hand (here classificaiton of genuine/fake samples), disre-
garding everything else.
The UAI framework splits a feedforward neural network
into an encoder and a predictor. The encoder is modified
such that it produces two representations (i.e. embedding
vectors) instead of one – e1 and e2, where only e1 is used for
the prediction task. Besides the encoder and the predictor,
the UAI framework consists of a decoder that reconstructs
data from a noisy version of e1 concatenated with e2, and
a pair of disentanglers that aim to predict one embedding
from the other. The disentanglers are trained adversarially
against the rest of the model, leading to disentanglement
between the two embeddings. The aforementioned com-
petition between the prediction and reconstruction tasks is
induced by the noisy channel that connects e1 to the de-
coder and the enforced disentanglement between e1 and e2,
which leads to information separation such that factors of
data truly relevant for the prediction task are encoded in e1
and all other factors of data (nuisance) migrate to e2. UAI
has been shown [12] to work effectively across a diverse
collection of datasets and nuisance factors. Hence, we em-
ploy UAI as an integral component in the proposed model.
3.4. RoPAD using UAI
As mentioned in Section 3.3, UAI splits the base feedfor-
ward (illustrated in Figure 2a) model into an encoder and a
predictor. We split the base CNN model of RoPAD at the
prediction block, such that all convolutional blocks as well
as the convolutional layer of the prediction block are collec-
tively treated as an encoder, while the two fully connected
layers are treated as a predictor. In order to produce two em-
bedding vectors from the encoder instead of one, as required
by UAI, we duplicate the final convolutional layer of the en-
coder as a parallel branch emerging from the final convolu-
tional block. The decoder is designed as a deconvolutional
network with four deconvolutional layers interspersed with
upsampling layers. The disentanglers are designed as single
fully-connected layers, and the noisy transformer is imple-
mented as multiplicative Bernoulli noise, following the ap-
proach of [12]. The complete RoPAD architecture is shown
in Figure 2b. RoPAD is implemented in Keras2 and trained
with TensorFlow3 backend. We follow the same adversarial
training strategy as prescribed in [12] of alternating between
training the disentanglers versus the rest of the model with
5 : 1 frequency.
Performing presentation attack detection with RoPAD at
test time is as efficient as with the base model. Although
Figure 2 shows a complex architecture used for training,
RoPAD is actually very light at prediction time. At test
time, RoPAD is reshaped so that the decoder and the dis-
entangler components of UAI are discarded. Thus, in terms
of efficiency and model complexity, RoPAD testing model
has the same structure as the base model, yet provides sig-
2https://keras.io/
3https://www.tensorflow.org/
Figure 3: From left to right, corresponding examples of image-types – (1) genuine, (2) glasses with doll eye, (3) analog
photo, (4) makeup, (6) paper glasses, (7) glasses with Van Dyke eye, (8) silicone mask, and (9) transparent mask.
Database Institute Real/Fake Attack Types
3DMAD Idiap 170 / 85 3D masks
Replay-Attack Idiap 200 / 1000 printed & replay
Replay-Mobile Idiap 390 / 640 printed & replay
MSU MFSD MSU 110 / 330 printed & replay
Table 1: Summary of benchmark datasets for PAD
nificantly more effective and robust predictions. In light of
this, prediction with RoPAD remains as easy as a single for-
ward pass without any additional computational cost.
4. Experimental Evaluation
4.1. Datasets And Metrics
The proposed RoPAD model is evaluated on the follow-
ing publicly available benchmark datasets for presentation
attack detection – 3DMAD [7], Idiap Replay-Mobile [6],
Idiap Replay-Attack [4], and MSU MFSD [23]. De-
tails of these datasets are summarized in Table 1. While
3DMAD exclusively contains presentation attacks involv-
ing 3D masks, the other datasets contain attacks through
printed faces and video-replays.
RoPAD is also evaluated on the Government Controlled
Testing-1 (GCT1) dataset. GCT1 is a dataset collected by
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory during Govern-
ment testing of the IARPA Odin project4. GCT1 contains
images of about 400 subjects, including various forms of
presentation attacks. The subjects were split into training,
validation and testing sets, such that all images of a given
subject belonged to only one of the three sets. Table 2 sum-
marizes the attack types and distribution of the attacks in
the training, validation and testing sets, which contain 215,
57 and 137 subjects, respectively. We will make the splits
publicly available as soon as GCT1 is released by NIST.
4Public release of GCT1 is planned by the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST)
Type Train Validation Test
Genuine 266 70 167
Glasses with Doll Eye 26 6 16
Analog Photo 30 7 18
Makeup 14 4 9
Paper Glasses 27 7 17
Glasses with Van Dyke Eye 26 7 17
Silicone Mask 3 3 4
Transparent Mask 20 5 13
Table 2: GCT1 – summary of real images and attacks
Evaluations are performed following the protocol used
in prior works for each dataset. Further, results for each
dataset are reported using the same metrics that previous
works used to reported their performance, for fair compari-
son. Half Total Error-Rate (HTER) [11] is reported for Idiap
Replay-Attack and 3DMAD, Equal Error Rate (EER) [23]
for MSU MSFD, and Attack Presentation Classification Er-
ror Rate (APCER) [11], Bona Fide Presentation Classifica-
tion Error Rate (BPCER)) [11] and ACER = (APCER +
BPCER)/2 [17] for Idiap Replay-Mobile dataset. Results
of PAD performance on GCT1 are reported using APCER,
BPCER, ACER, EER, and the Area Under the Receiver
Operating Curve (AUC). Ablation study was performed by
training and evaluating the base CNN model of RoPAD
(BM) without the UAI components and results of these ex-
periments are also reported.
4.2. Evaluation Results
Idiap Replay-Attack: Table 3 summarizes the experi-
mental results on the Idiap Replay-Attack dataset. As
shown, the proposed model achieves a perfect HTER of 0
on this dataset, outperforming the state of the art [19].
Idiap Replay-Mobile: In Table 4 we summarize the
results of our experiments on the Idiap Replay-Mobile
Method HTER
LBP+CCoLBP [18] 5.38
CCoLBP [18] 5.25
LDP+TOP [19] 1.75
BM 0.38
RoPAD 0
Table 3: Test HTER (%) on Idiap Replay-Attack
Method ACER APCER BPCER
IQM [6] 13.64 19.87 7.40
Gabor [6] 9.53 7.91 11.15
LBP+GS-LBP [17] 1.74 2.09 1.38
LGBP [17] 1.50 2.08 0.91
LGBP (video) [17] 1.25 1.40 1.10
BM 0.90 0 1.80
RoPAD 0 0 0
Table 4: Test results (%) on Idiap Replay-Mobile.
dataset. While BM outperforms the previous state-of-the-
art on the ACER and APCER scores, the proposed RoPAD
model performs the best on all metrics, achieving a perfect
score of 0 on each.
MSUMFSD: The proposed RoPAD outperforms the pre-
vious state-of-the-art models on the MSU MSFD dataset,
as shown in Table 5. In contrast, BM performs significantly
worse than the previous best model. This large performance
boost is, hence, credited to the UAI component of RoPAD,
and is further highlighted by the Receiver Operating Curve
(ROC) shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Receiver Operating Curves for MSU MSFD
Method EER
DoG-LBP+SVM [23] 23.10
LBP + SVM[23] 14.70
IDA + SVM [23] 8.85
LDP + TOP [19] 6.54
CCoLBP[18] 5.83
LBP + CCoLBP [18] 5.00
BM 7.15
RoPAD 1.70
Table 5: Test EER (%) on MFSD
Method HTER
LBP + LDA [7] 0.95
BM 1.00
RoPAD 0
Table 6: Test HTER (%) on 3DMAD
3DMAD: Table 6 summarizes results of our experiments
on the 3DMAD dataset. While the ablation version BM
performs worse than previous state-of-the-art, the proposed
RoPAD achieves a perfect HTER of 0 on this dataset also.
GCT1: The proposed model achieves near perfect score
at PAD on the GCT1 dataset, as shown in Table 7. In com-
parison to the base model, the ACER, EER and AUC of
RoPAD are 12.1, 5.6 and 1.5 percentage points higher, re-
spectively, which highlights a clear improvement in perfor-
mance due to the incorporation of UAI in RoPAD, as further
reflected in Figure 5.
In summary, taking into consideration the results of the
proposed model on the aforementioned benchmark datasets,
Figure 5: Receiver Operating Curves for GCT1
Method APCER BPCER ACER EER Validation AUC Test AUC
BM 28.7 0.5 14.6 7.4 0.957 0.983
RoPAD 4.2 1.0 2.5 1.8 1.000 0.998
Table 7: Results on GCT1 — all metrics except AUC are reported as percentages (%)
it is evident that the proposed RoPAD outperforms previous
state-of-the-art models across the board. Results of the abla-
tion version of the proposed model, on the other hand, show
that the UAI component of RoPAD is crucial to achieving
this outstanding performance.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
The increasing demand for face-based biometric au-
thentication calls for robust technologies that are protected
against attacks that can fool such systems. In this paper, we
presented a novel deep neural network model, RoPAD, for
detecting presentation attacks in such systems. RoPAD is
designed as a deep convolutional neural network and trained
to make robust predictions by employing unsupervised ad-
versarial invariance, which makes RoPAD invariant to fac-
tors in face images that are irrelevant for presentation attack
detection. Results of extensive experimental evaluation on
several datasets show that RoPAD achieves state-of-the-art
performance at presentation attack detection.
The base CNN model of the proposed RoPAD is inspired
from the VGG16 model. In future work, we plan to exper-
iment with more sophisticated models like ResNet [10] to
create improved versions of RoPAD.
Acknowledgements
This research is based upon work supported by the Of-
fice of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), In-
telligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA),
via IARPA R&D Contract No. 2017-17020200005. The
views and conclusions contained herein are those of the au-
thors and should not be interpreted as necessarily represent-
ing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed
or implied, of the ODNI, IARPA, or the U.S. Government.
The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and dis-
tribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding
any copyright annotation thereon.
References
[1] Y. Atoum, Y. Liu, A. Jourabloo, and X. Liu. Face anti-
spoofing using patch and depth-based cnns. In Biometrics
(IJCB), 2017 IEEE International Joint Conference on, pages
319–328. IEEE, 2017. 2
[2] Z. Boulkenafet, J. Komulainen, and A. Hadid. Face anti-
spoofing based on color texture analysis. In Image Process-
ing (ICIP), 2015 IEEE International Conference on, pages
2636–2640. IEEE, 2015. 2
[3] Z. Boulkenafet, J. Komulainen, and A. Hadid. Face anti-
spoofing using speeded-up robust features and fisher vector
encoding. IEEE Signal Processing Letters, 24(2):141–145,
2017. 2
[4] I. Chingovska, A. Anjos, and S. Marcel. On the effectiveness
of local binary patterns in face anti-spoofing. In Proceedings
of the 11th International Conference of the Biometrics Spe-
cial Interes Group, number EPFL-CONF-192369, 2012. 2,
5
[5] D. Clevert, T. Unterthiner, and S. Hochreiter. Fast and accu-
rate deep network learning by exponential linear units (elus).
CoRR, abs/1511.07289, 2015. 4
[6] A. Costa-Pazo, S. Bhattacharjee, E. Vazquez-Fernandez,
and S. Marcel. The replay-mobile face presentation-attack
database. In Biometrics Special Interest Group (BIOSIG),
2016 International Conference of the, pages 1–7. IEEE,
2016. 2, 5, 6
[7] N. Erdogmus and S. Marcel. Spoofing in 2d face recogni-
tion with 3d masks and anti-spoofing with kinect. In IEEE
Sixth International Conference on Biometrics: Theory, Ap-
plications and Systems, pages 1–6, 2014. 2, 5, 6
[8] J. Gan, S. Li, Y. Zhai, and C. Liu. 3d convolutional neural
network based on face anti-spoofing. In Multimedia and Im-
age Processing (ICMIP), 2017 2nd International Conference
on, pages 1–5. IEEE, 2017. 2
[9] D. Gragnaniello, G. Poggi, C. Sansone, and L. Verdoliva.
An investigation of local descriptors for biometric spoofing
detection. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, 10:849–863, 2015. 2
[10] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun. Deep residual learning
for image recognition. In The IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), June 2016. 7
[11] ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 - Biometrics. Information Technol-
ogy Biometric presentation attack detection part 1: Frame-
work. Standard, International Organization for Standardiza-
tion, 2016. https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/iso. 5
[12] A. Jaiswal, Y. Wu, W. Abd-Almageed, and P. Natarajan. Un-
supervised adversarial invariance. In Advances in Neural In-
formation Processing Systems 31, pages 5097–5107. Curran
Associates, Inc., 2018. 2, 4
[13] A. Jourabloo, Y. Liu, and X. Liu. Face de-spoofing:
Anti-spoofing via noise modeling. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1807.09968, 1(2):3, 2018. 2
[14] Y. Liu, A. Jourabloo, and X. Liu. Learning deep models for
face anti-spoofing: Binary or auxiliary supervision. In Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition, pages 389–398, 2018. 2
[15] J. Ma¨a¨tta¨, A. Hadid, and M. Pietika¨inen. Face spoofing de-
tection from single images using micro-texture analysis. In
Biometrics (IJCB), 2011 international joint conference on,
pages 1–7. IEEE, 2011. 2
[16] R. F. Nogueira, R. de Alencar Lotufo, and R. C. Machado.
Fingerprint liveness detection using convolutional neural
networks. IEEE Trans. Information Forensics and Security,
11(6):1206–1213, 2016. 2
[17] F. Peng, L. Qin, and M. Long. Face presentation attack de-
tection using guided scale texture. Multimedia Tools and Ap-
plications, pages 1–27, 2017. 2, 5, 6
[18] F. Peng, L. Qin, and M. Long. Ccolbp: Chromatic co-
occurrence of local binary pattern for face presentation at-
tack detection. In 2018 27th International Conference on
Computer Communication and Networks (ICCCN), pages 1–
9. IEEE, 2018. 2, 6
[19] Q.-T. Phan, D.-T. Dang-Nguyen, G. Boato, and F. G. De Na-
tale. Face spoofing detection using ldp-top. In Image
Processing (ICIP), 2016 IEEE International Conference on,
pages 404–408. IEEE, 2016. 5, 6
[20] R. Raghavendra, K. B. Raja, and C. Busch. Presentation
attack detection for face recognition using light field camera.
IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, 24(3):1060–1075,
2015. 1
[21] R. Ramachandra and C. Busch. Presentation attack detec-
tion methods for face recognition systems: a comprehensive
survey. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 50(1):8, 2017. 1,
2
[22] K. Simonyan and A. Zisserman. Very deep convolu-
tional networks for large-scale image recognition. CoRR,
abs/1409.1556, 2014. 3, 4
[23] D. Wen, H. Han, and A. K. Jain. Face spoof detection with
image distortion analysis. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, 10(4):746–761, 2015. 2, 5, 6
[24] J. Yang, Z. Lei, and S. Z. Li. Learn convolutional neural net-
work for face anti-spoofing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1408.5601,
2014. 2
